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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) and 78-22(3)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Issues Presented.
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the
Appellees are the owners of the property claimed by Appellant and portions of which he
conveyed to third parties, and was title properly quieted in the Appellees?
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Appellant
had published documents defaming the Appellees' title to their property and did Appellant
do so with the requisite malice?
3. Was there sufficient evidence presented to make clearly erroneous the trial
court's ruling that Cummings failed to show that the boundary between his property and
that of the Gillmors was established by acquiescence?
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the Appellant to introduce evidence
of the value of the property and evidence of the amounts paid by the title insurer of the
other defendants to settle with the Appellees and to purchase portions of the disputed
property from the Appellees to support a claim of an off-set for the Appellees' damages?
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Appellant to amend
his pleadings at trial to include a defense of adverse possession, where he did not raise
adverse possession as a defense in his amended answer and counterclaim, and did the
1

district court abuse its discretion in precluding the Appellant from introducing evidence of
payment of taxes on the subject property, having found that this would surprise and
prejudice the Appellees?
6. Did the trial court err in rejecting Appellant's counterclaim for slander of title
based on the filing of a notice of lis pendens in the case?
1. Did the trial court err in arbitrarily reducing by half the attorneys' fees awarded
to the Appellees as special damages for slander of title without making findings articulating
its reasons and the factual basis in the record for doing so and in the absence of
controverting evidence?
B. Standard of Appellate Review,
All issues of fact presented in this appeal are governed by the "clearly erroneous"
standard set forth in Alta Ind., Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Sorenson
v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The trial
court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174,
1175 (Utah 1989). The trial court's refusal to grant leave, at trial, to amend pleadings, and
the trial court's refusal to admit certain evidence, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.

The plaintiff-appellees, Frank and Nadine Gillmor,

commenced this action against the defendant-appellant, Veigh Cummings, to quiet title to
certain land in Summit County, and for damages for slander of the Gillmors' title which
2

occurred when Cummings signed and delivered deeds to portions of the subject property,
impugning the Gillmors' ownership. The Gillmors also sued Cummings's successors to
portions of the subject property, but these parties settled with the Gillmors prior to trial
by purchasing from the Gillmors the portions of the subject property used by the settling
defendants.
B. Disposition Below. A bench trial was held on August 10, 1993, and the district
court entered its Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title on November 23, 1993. The district
court thereafter re-opened the evidence and additional trial testimony was taken on
February 16 and 17, 1994. An Amended Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title was entered
on May 10, 1994, which quieted title to the subject property in the Gillmors and awarded
damages in the form of attorneys' fees in the amount of $52,563.54.
Cummings appealed and the Gillmors cross-appealed on the amount of the
attorneys' fees awarded them by the district court.
C. Statement of Facts. This appeal concerns a dispute surrounding title to a
triangular parcel of ground in Summit County lying to the west of what is commonly
referred to as Old Ranch Road. The dispute focuses on the interpretation of a boundary
description in two deeds from a common grantor, Charles R. Spencer.
Spencer divided his property, deeding the east part to the Gillmors' predecessor
under a Warranty Deed dated October 25, 1926 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) and the west part to

The passage of title from Spencer through various members of the Gillmor family to the
Gillmors is uncontroverted, complex and unnecessary to an understanding of the issues of this
appeal
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Cummings's grantors, Emil and Bernice Marcellin, under an October 30, 1930 Warranty
Deed (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23). Both deeds from Spencer contain the identical boundary line
description and the deed from the Marcellins to Cummings, dated September 7, 1961,
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19), contains the same description as the deed the Marcellins had
received from Spencer in 1930 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23).
The Gillmors agree with the statement in Appellant's Brief, that "the only factual
issue is where that legal description fell on the ground." (Appellant's Brief, at 10). The
description of the pertinent boundary line, in all three deeds, reads as follows:
. . . thence West approximately 5 rods to a point on the Easterly side
of the aforesaid 6 rod wide road and at a point 3 rods Easterly from
the center line of said road and at right angles thereto; thence along
the Easterly side of said road and 3 rods Easterly from the center line
thereof and at right angles thereto, Northerly and Westerly to a point
3 rods East from the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 28, aforesaid; thence West 3 rods; thence Northwesterly on a
direct line 61 rods, more or less, to the point of beginning.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). The fundamental issue lies, specifically, in the correct interpretation
of the deed call "to a point 3 rods East from the Southwest corner of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 28, aforesaid; thence West 3 rods; thence Northwesterly on a direct line
61 rods, more or less, to the point of beginning." Cummings asserts that the call must be
interpreted so that the point " 3 rods East from the Southwest corner of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 28" necessarily lies on the east side of the road. In contrast, the
Gillmors' position, accepted by the trial court, is that the line leaves the road and does not
relate to any physical monument, but runs to a theoretical point lying three rods east of the
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quarter corner, just as the deed reads. The Gillmors also submit that even if the call is to
a point on the east side of the road, the evidence shows that the location of the road
moved to the east after the deed was delivered.
Cummings bought the Marcellins' property jointly, with Allen Pelton, with the
intention to subdivide it (R. 1500). Cummings and Pelton took title to the Marcellins'
property, west of the Gillmor property, in 1961. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). They did so under
a deed containing the same description as the Marcellins had received from the common
grantor, Spencer. (Id.).
Prior to the time Cummings received the deed from the Marcellins, he testified he
had not seen a legal description of the property he was buying. (R. 1498). When he
received the deed, he did not try and locate any of the boundaries described in it. (Id.).
Instead, Cummings hired a surveyor, Parley Neeley, to survey the property using the center
of the road. (R. 1519-20). Cummings could not, however, testify that he gave his deed,
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19), to Neeley with instructions to survey the property's boundaries. (R.
1499). He merely met with Neeley and "showed him the ground we had bought. . .". (R.
1506).
Neeley testified that Cummings showed him the property he had purchased and
instructed Neeley to survey the boundary to the middle of the road, and Neeley did so,
performing a survey without the use of deed descriptions. (R. 1109-11). Neeley further
testified that there was no fence along Old Ranch Road in the relevant area. (R. 1113).
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Cummings testified that even though he knew that the survey he had instructed
Neeley to prepare would define the boundary with the Gillmors, he did not attempt to find
the boundaries in the deed he and Pelton had received from the Marcellins, (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 19), nor did he compare the legal descriptions in the Neeley survey plat with those
in the deed from the Marcellins. (R. 1506). Nor did Cummings ever communicate with the
Gillmors to see whether they agreed with the survey's boundary, or not. (R. 1519-20).
Cummings further testified that the legal descriptions he used in conveying property to the
other defendants came from the survey plat Neeley had prepared, not from the description
in his deed from the Marcellins. (R. 1508).
The Gillmors' claim for slander of title arises from a deed Cummings gave to Pelton,
dated September 22, 1970, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7), a second deed from Cummings to Pelton,
dated August 14, 1972, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8), and a right-of-way deed Cummings recorded
on December 3, 1980, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9), the descriptions in which deeds overlap the
west boundary of the Gillmors' property. Pelton, in turn, sold portions of the disputed
property under deeds he gave to the remaining defendants.

All defendants except

Cummings settled with the Gillmors prior to trial by purchasing title to the property they
occupied.
During trial, much evidence was presented concerning the location of Old Ranch
Road. Frank Marcellin, the son of Emil and Bernice Marcellin, Cummings's grantors, was
born on the property in 1931 and lived there until 1953. (R. 1948). He continued to help
his father on the property on a daily basis until 1961, (R. 1948), and he visited the property
6

at least once a week thereafter in his work as a Utah Highway Patrol trooper, for the next
twelve years. (R. 1949-50).
Mr. Marcellin testified that this relevant part of Old Ranch Road was relocated to
the east from its original location during the early 1930's, by the Work Projects
Administration, when he was a small boy. (R. 1469-70; 1474-75). The road was realigned
over a period of several years, (R. 1471-2), to move it up-slope from the base of the hill,
to the east. (R. 1476; 1954). Thereafter, although the Marcellin family continued to use
the old road to bring livestock to their barn, (R. 1483), the County has maintained Old
Ranch Road along the re-aligned course. (R. 1487).
Although Cummings produced a number of witnesses to testify concerning the
location of Old Ranch Road, those witnesses either had no personal knowledge of the
location of the road during the early-1930's or their testimony deferred to the evidence
given by Frank Marcellin, who had actually lived on the property when the road was
realigned. The district court chose to accept the testimony of Frank Marcellin concerning
the relocation of the road since he had grown up on the property and had the "best
knowledge" of the road's location. (R. 1378). Accordingly, the district court quieted title
to the disputed property in the Gillmors, found that Cummings had slandered the Gillmors'
title, and awarded the Gillmors special damages in the form of attorneys' fees and costs.
Paragraph 11 of the district court's findings of fact in the Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law finds that the Gillmors spent $81,140.27 in legal fees and $11,993.50
for survey and engineering costs. (R. 1283). Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law simply
7

awards the Gillmors "50% of the $81,140.27 in attorneys' fees or the amount of $40,570.14
. . . " (R. 1284). Cummings did not present any evidence that the amount of fees sought
by the Gillmors as special damages was excessive nor the reasonableness or necessity of the
fees the Gillmors incurred.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly quieted title to the disputed property in the Gillmors. The
property description in the deeds from the parties' common grantor clearly and
unambiguously calls to and along the road, but then leaves the road to call to a theoretical
point west of the present location of Old Ranch Road. Appellant's interpretation of the
deed description, which he insists follows the present location of the road, is an incorrect
construction of the deed language, as a matter of law.
The testimony at trial also supports the Gillmors' interpretation of the deed
description.

The trial court found the Gillmors' surveyor to be more credible in his

interpretation of the property description, and other and sufficient evidence supports the
trial court's conclusion. Even if Cummings's interpretation of the deed language is correct,
there was sufficient evidence presented that Old Ranch Road had been re-aligned to the
east of its original position, after the deeds from Spencer, the common grantor, were
delivered.
There was also sufficient evidence at trial to support the trial court's finding that
Cummings recorded documents impugning the Gillmors' title to their property, that he did
so maliciously, recklessly, and without regard for either the truth of the statements in the
8

documents or of the rights of the Gillmors, and in order to enhance the value of his own
property. Each of the elements of slander of title are supported by evidence in the record.
There is no support in the record for Cummings's assertion that the boundary
between his property and that of the Gillmors was established by acquiescence. There is
no evidence that any fence, natural boundary or road, other than the description in the
deeds, was the basis of any agreement between the parties or their predecessors in interest.
The value of the property is immaterial to the special damages suffered by the
Gillmors, which are the attorneys' fees and costs necessary to quiet title to their own
property. The amounts paid by the title insurer to settle this matter were to purchase title
to portions of the subject property, and Cummings is not entitled to an off-set for those
amounts.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cummings request, made
at trial, to amend his pleadings to include a defense of adverse possession of the subject
property. Cummings did not raise adverse possession as a defense in his amended answer
and counterclaim and the district court properly ruled that permitting Cummings to put on
evidence of payment of taxes on the subject property would surprise and prejudice the
Gillmors.
The trial court's rejection of Cummings's counterclaim that the Gillmors had
slandered his title by the filing of a notice of lis pendens, was correct, both on the evidence
and as a matter of law. Cummings failed to show that the property in question belongs to
him, and therefore he had no ownership which could be defamed. Further, the filing of
9

a lis pendens in connection with an action such as this one, where the title to realty is at
issue, is privileged.
However, the district court erred in determining the amount of attorneys' fees to
award the Gillmors as special damages caused by Cummings's slander of title. As with any
award of damages, an award of attorneys' fees as special damages must be made on the
basis of evidence in the record. Here, the Gillmors' evidence of their special damages was
uncontroverted. Yet, the trial court arbitrarily reduced the damages award by one-half and
did not make any findings or present any justification on the record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY QUIETED TITLE IN THE
GILLMORS.
The issue of whether the trial court properly quieted title to the subject property is
hardly as complicated as the Appellant's Brief would make it appear. The issue actually
involves a simple interpretation of a call in a property description in the deeds the parties'
predecessors received from Charles Spencer.
The boundary segment is described identically in each of the historical deeds. The
deeds all describe the boundary as the east side of a six-rod wide road for part of the
distance. The dispute arises when the deed makes the next call, to a specific point which
is three rods east of the southwest corner of the northwest quarter of Section 28:

10

. . . thence along the Easterly side of said road and 3 rods Easterly
from the center line thereof and at right angles thereto, Northerly and
Westerly to a point 3 rods East from the Southwest corner to the
Northwest Quarter of Section 28, aforesaid; thence West 3 rods;
thence Northwesterly on a direct line 61 rods, more or less, to the
point of beginning. (Emphasis supplied).
The crux of the case concerns these three calls and whether the call "to a point" is
in reference to the road or in reference to the west quarter corner of Section 28.
Cummings asserts that this point must be on the east side of the road, whereas the deed
places the call to a point three rods east of the quarter corner. The deed describes the
point, not with reference to the road or any other physical monument, but to a theoretical
point which is three rods east from the quarter corner. The Gillmors submit that this
description is unambiguous and, accordingly, its interpretation is "a question of law for the
court[.]"

Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979). See also, Stephen V.

Estopinal, "A Guide To Understanding Land Surveys" (1989) (Defendant's Exhibit 45)
("The words 'to a point' indicate that the limit is not set by a physical feature, but by a
theoretical location.").
Even if the deed description is ambiguous and extraneous evidence is necessary to
interpret it, the weight of that evidence supports the trial court's ruling. The Gillmors
produced more consistent and persuasive expert testimony concerning the interpretation of
the boundary description than did Cummings. Since the evidence must be examined in a
light most favorable to the district court's decision. Cummings cannot show that the finding
of the court below is not based on sufficient evidence.
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Kent Wilde, Cummings's expert surveyor, testified that his interpretation of the deed
call requires that the boundaries follow the easterly side of the existing road. (R. 1765).
In other words, Mr. Wilde used the existing road as his "monument" for the entire boundary
segment. (Id.) Mr. Wilde testified that in his opinion, the intent of the deed is to go from
the west quarter corner to the point of beginning, all along the easterly side of the road.
(R. 1774-75). For Wilde's survey to be correct, of course, the quarter corner would have
to be in the center of the present road, which it is not. (R. 1782). Mr. Wilde admitted
that if his interpretation of the deed is correct, and the west quarter corner is in the road,
then the west quarter corner monument set by the original survey of the area has to have
been misplaced by almost 240 feet. (R. 1777).
James West, the Gillmors' expert surveyor, testified that he does not agree with the
interpretation placed on the calls, points and distances in Exhibit 1 by Mr. Wilde because,
given the visibility in the area, it is not possible for the original survey to have misplaced
the location of the west quarter corner of Section 28 by as much as 240 feet. (R. 1993-95;
1619-21). Further, Mr. West testified that if the drafter of the deed description had
intended to use the road to define the boundary, the description would have simply
followed the east side of the road to the point of beginning instead of calling to a point 3
rods east of the quarter corner. (R. 1998; 1623-24). Instead, the deed refers to the section
quarter corner and follows from that, not the road. (R. 1623).
At trial, Cummings' counsel attempted to impeach Mr. West's expert testimony using
a surveyor's treatise entitled "A Guide To Understanding Land Surveys" by Stephen V.
12

Estopinal (Defendant's Exhibit 45). However, that treatise actually supports the Gillmors'
interpretation of the deed. It states:
The key word °to' has special significance in demonstrating the
intention of the parties and the transfer of titles. To' announces that
the boundary line segment is being terminated, and the corner
description that immediately follows the word 'to' is considered by the
writer to control the length of the boundary line segment. The words
'to a point' indicate that the limit is not set by a physical feature, but
by a theoretical location. (Emphasis supplied).
Id. at 171. Here, the description follows the east side of the road and then "to a point 3
rods East from the Southwest corner of the Northeast 1/4 of Section 28, aforesaid; thence
West...". (Emphasis supplied). Thus, by the very source which Cummings presented at trial
as authoritative, the call in the description must refer not to the road, but to a theoretical
point which is three rods west of the quarter corner, regardless of the location of the road.
The boundary description at issue here is unambiguous. The rule that in the event
of an ambiguity a monument takes precedence over a call of course or distances, Williams
v. Oldroyd, 581 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1978), does not apply to this case precisely because
there is no ambiguity. The description in the deed calls to the road and then to a point
lying three rods west of the west quarter corner, without any reference to the road. Thus,
as a matter of law, the deed must be interpreted in the Gillmors' favor.
Even if the deed description continuously refers to the road and the call to the point
three rods west of the west quarter corner is disregarded, Cummings' position remains
untenable because the "monument" upon which he relies - the existing road - was moved
after the deeds from Charles Spencer. Frank Marcellin, the son of Emil and Bernice
13

Marcellin, actually lived on the property from 1931 until 1953. (R. 1948). He continued
to visit the property on a daily basis, milking cows for his family, from 1953 to 1961, (Id.),
and visited the property occasionally after 1961 for the next twelve years, in connection with
his duties as a Utah Highway Patrol trooper. (R. 1949; 1486).
Frank Marcellin testified that an old road went around the base of the hill to the
west of the present road, which was abandoned when a new road was built by the Works
Project Administration in the early 1930's. (R. 1954). The WPA took two or three years
to finish the new alignment, until 1935 or 1936, when Mr. Marcellin was four or five years
old. (R. 1972).
Frank Marcellin further testified that there was a fence along the old road, which
he repaired on many occasions.

(R. 1954). There was no fence along the present

alignment of the road, (R. 1955) until 1963 or 1964, when Cummings added one. Mr.
Marcellin observed the fence along the present road being built in 1963 or 1964, (R. 1956),
where there had not been a fence before. (R. 1957). He related that before the fence was
moved, the Gillmors would trail their sheep in the Spring and would open the gate and let
the sheep water at Kimball Creek on the bottom of the hill on the west side of the old
fence. (R. 1958-60).
Mr. Marcellin's evidence was clear and unequivocal:
I'll swear on a Bible that that fence and that road was down at the
bottom of the hill, right around our property. It was not up there on
that hill.

14

(R. 1987). When questioned by the district court, Mr. Marcellin testified that he last saw
the old road at the bottom of the hill when he used to go fishing there, after his father had
sold the property:
THE COURT: When was the last time you saw that road in the way
you remember it?
THE WITNESS: That one at the bottom?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE WITNESS: I guess the last time I seen that was maybe about
in '61.
In '61 my dad sold that ground, but he stayed there until '62.
And I used to go back not only patrolling the roads, but I also went
fishing there, and that road, I still turned down off of it and went
down in the bottom next to the creek and parked there.
(R. 1987-88). Frank Marcellin also testified that before the WPA changed its location and
improved it, Old Ranch Road was simply a set of wagon tracks through the sagebrush. (R.
1973-74).
In summary, Frank Marcellin's testimony establishes that the road which Kent Wilde,
Cummings' expert surveyor, relies upon as a monument determining the boundary line, was
realigned and moved after the deeds from Charles Spencer, the parties' predecessor.
James West, the Gillmors' expert surveyor, testified that Frank Marcellin's
description of the realignment of the old location of the road is consistent with the
boundary call leaving the road to a point three rods east of the west quarter corner. (R.
2018-19). The Gillmors also submit that Mr. Marcellin's depiction of the Old Ranch Road
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as simply wagon tracks through the sagebrush explains why the deeds from Spencer called
to the point three rods from the quarter corner rather than the road itself; the location of
the road was not considered a good monument to use in the deed description because it
was not much of a road.
Cummings called a number of witnesses in a futile attempt to refute Frank
Marcellin's testimony that Old Ranch Road had been re-aligned.

Cummings himself

testified that in 1941 when he picked up milk from the Marcellins' ranch, Old Ranch Road
was exactly where it is now. (R. 1523). This, of course, is years after the road had been
realigned, as Frank Marcellin testified. Allen Pelton was not able to testify as to the
location of Old Ranch Road prior to 1961. (R. 2037-38). David Loertscher testified that
he became familiar with Old Ranch Road in 1925 at the age of 15. (R. 2042). He
testified, as had Frank Marcellin, that at the time "it was just more or less a road through
the sagebrush for farmers." (R. 2043). Mr. Loertscher conceded, however, that by 1934,
the time Mr. Marcellin testified the WPA crews were working on Old Ranch Road, he was
working on another ranch in the area and may not have noticed the work. (R. 2049-51).
Blaine Bittner testified that the WPA made no changes to the road that he knows
of. However, when questioned by counsel whether if it would surprise him to know that
Frank Marcellin had testified that he watched the WPA crew make changes in the road

Although a monument ordinarily takes precedence over a call of courses or distances in
interpreting a deed description, where the location of a natural or artificial boundary is in doubt,
"recourse is had to artificial marks or monuments or other calls of an inferior degree of accuracy."
Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 299 (Wyo. 1983).
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around the Marcellin home, Mr. Bittner answered: "I can't refute him because he lived
there." (R. 2077). Hyrum Peterson, also called by Cummings, testified that Old Ranch
Road was "just about two wagon tracks", (R. 2082), that he never had occasion to use the
road prior to 1936 or 1937, (R. 2083), and he knows nothing about the work the WPA
crews did on the road in the early-1930's. (R. 2084).
The trial court found Frank Marcellin's testimony about the relocation of Old Ranch
Road the most persuasive. This is neither surprising nor unreasonable since he is the only
witness called by either party who actually lived on the property, having grown from an
infant to an adult alongside the disputed parcel. The trial court described Marcellin's as
the "best knowledge" concerning any change in the alignment of the road. (R. 1378).
In addition, Mr. Marcellin testified about a conversation he had had with Cummings
the week before the trial. Marcellin testified that he asked Cummings who had told
Cummings that he owned the triangular piece of property which is the subject of this
dispute. In response, Cummings admitted to Marcellin that he simply "assumed" he owned
it. (R. 1528-30).
As the trier of fact, the trial court's findings are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous"
standard. Alta Ind., Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). "A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is against the great weight of evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174,
1175 (Utah 1989). A factual finding is not "clearly erroneous" if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, it is based upon sufficient
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evidence, even though the record may contain conflicting testimony. State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). As demonstrated above, even assuming that the deed
description is ambiguous, (which it is not), the quantity and quality of evidence presented
at trial supports the district court's decision quieting title to the subject property in the
Gillmors.
POINT H
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURTS
FINDING OF SLANDER OF TITLE BY CUMMINGS.
A — The Evidence Shows Cummings Acted With Malice.
The trial court found that Cummings had slandered the Gillmors' title to their
property and awarded them damages.

(Amended Findings of Fact, U 8, R. 1282).

Cummings appeals on the ground that there is no evidence of malice to support a finding
of slander of title. For Cummings to prevail, this Court must be convinced that the trial
court's finding is "clearly erroneous". Alta Ind., 846 P.2d at 1286. The Gillmors submit that
there is ample evidence in the record from which the trial court could, and did, find that
Cummings acted with the requisite state of mind.
Malice is a necessary element of a slander of title action. The Gillmors concede
that Cummings did not state before witnesses that he recorded deeds on the Gillmors'
property because of a personal antipathy motivating him to injure them. Such evidence
would be rare indeed, and is, in any event, unnecessary. "In order to commit the tort [of
slander of title] actual malice or ill-will is unnecessary." Olson v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 510,
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513 (Utah 1951). Thus, malice need not be affirmatively proven, but "may be implied in
law." Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah 1988).
The Supreme Court later elaborated on this principle:
A published false statement, however, does not constitute slander of
title without the element of malice. Malice may be affirmatively
proven or implied. Affirmative proof requires a showing that the
wrong was done with an intent to injure, vex or annoy. Malice may
be implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully records or
publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a false or
misleading impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that
it should reasonably foresee might result in damage to the owner of
the property.
First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989)
(footnote omitted). In this case, Cummings' actions involved a deliberate false statement
of ownership and, at the very least, were reckless, a conclusion which is amply supported
by the evidence.
Cummings' 1961 deed from Emil and Bernice Marcellin has the metes and bounds
description of the property he purchased. Nonetheless, Cummings' own testimony shows
that instead of giving his deed to Parley Neeley, whom he hired to survey his newlyacquired property, Cummings instructed Mr. Neeley to prepare what Mr. Neeley
characterized as a "possession" or "post" survey. (R. 1506). Mr. Neeley testified that
Cummings showed him the property and instructed him to survey the boundary to the
middle of the road.

(Id.).

Cummings testified that he did not compare the legal

descriptions in the Neeley survey plat with those on his deed from the Marcellins. (R.
1506). Although he knew the survey was to find the boundary between his property and
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the Gillmors' he made no attempt to contact the Gillmors to see if they disagreed with this
boundary line. (R. 1519-20).
Finally, Cummings' quotes his own testimony, that he was told by Emil Marcellin
that the road was the boundary. However, this testimony is contradicted by Cummings's
own admission to Frank Marcellin, reported in Mr. Marcellin's testimony about a
conversation he and Cummings had shortly before trial, that he, Cummings, simply
"assumed" that the road was the boundary. During that conversation, Cummings did not
claim to that he had been told by Frank Marcellin's father that the road was the boundary.
(R. 1528-30). Moreover, at trial, Cummings did not deny the substance of the conversation
testified to by Frank Marcellin.
Interestingly, when Pelton and Cummings dissolved their partnership in 1965 and
Pelton needed to deed his interest in the property back to Cummings, Pelton used the same
description as was in the deed from the Marcellins to Pelton and Cummings in 1961. This
demonstrates that Cummings had access to that description in the same year he retained
Parley Neeley and could easily have provided it to Mr. Neeley to survey for him. (R. 14991500). Instead, Cummings showed him the ground he wanted surveyed and instructed mr.
Neeley to do a "possession" survey. (Deposition of Parley Neeley, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, at
10 and 16). Cummings testified that Neeley was given a copy of the tax notice for the
property, (R. 1510), but Mr. Neeley testified that he does not recall being given a property
description and that there is no indication from his file that he was given one. (Deposition
of Parley Neeley, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, at 10).
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It is obvious that Cummings' testimony is self-serving and contradicts both Parley
Neeley and Frank Marcellin. Messrs. Neeley and Marcellin are disinterested third-party
witnesses with nothing to gain by coloring their testimony.

The most reasonable

construction of events is that when Cummings bought the property from the Marcellins,
there was a gap between that property and the road, which was on the other side of the
boundary line. Cummings had every incentive to enhance the value of his property by
having it surveyed to the middle of the road and fencing it, both adding to his lands and
providing his lands with valuable road frontage. Ample evidence supports the inference
that Cummings deliberately produced the deeds to expropriate property which he coveted,
but did not legally own. This is all that is required to prove malice.
B-

The Gillmors Are Entitled To Damages For Slander Of Title.
Cummings contends that the Gillmors proved no damages for slander of title

because there was no "lost sale". Concededly, actual or "special" damages are a necessary
element in a slander of title action. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 208 P.2d 956, 958 (Utah
1949). However, those damages need not take the form of profits lost on a sale to a third
party:
Attorney fees have been held to be recoverable as special
damages if incurred to remove a cloud placed by the defendant on the
title.

For example, where the negligence of a trustee under a trust deed required a recipient of a
partial reconveyance of the trust property to institute a quiet title action against the assignee of the
trust deed's beneficial interest, the reconveyance recipient was entitled to recover attorneys' fees in
a quiet title action against the trustee. South Sanpitch Co, v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
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Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1988). Thus,
[i]n a slander of title action, the plaintiff must prove actual pecuniary
damage, and proof of attorneys' fees and other costs of a quiet title
suit to remove the slander are such pecuniary damages. Thus, in a
slander of title action, the amount of attorneys' fees incurred to quiet
title is not allowed merely as a extra expense of suit, but is a measure
of damages itself.
Den-Gar Enterprises, L.P. v. Romero, 611 P.2d 1119, 1124 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
Here, with the requisite malice, Cummings recorded documents disparaging the
Gillmors' title to their property, forcing them to litigate the issue of their ownership with
the other defendants, who had purchased the property from Cummings or his successors.
The attorneys' fees, surveyors' fees and costs required to vindicate the Gillmors' title are
special damages proximately caused by Cummings' tortious conduct and are recoverable as
such.
C-

Cummings Is Not Entitled To A Set-Off For The Amounts The Other Defendants
Paid In Settlement.
Prior to the trial, all the other defendants, the present owners of the subject property

who purchased from Cummings or his successors, settled with the Gillmors and paid them
for deeds to portions of the Gillmors' property at issue in this action. The settlement with
the other defendants did not resolve the dispute as to all of the subject property and
Cummings continues to litigate with the Gillmors over the fundamental issues of the case.
Nonetheless, Cummings asserts that he is entitled to an off-set for the amounts the other
defendants paid the Gillmors in settlement. The district court ruled that Cummings was
not entitled to deduct from the damages awarded against him, the amount paid by the
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other defendants to settle the case by purchasing part of the property from the Gillmors.
(R. 2025).
This ruling should be affirmed.

As noted above, the damages the trial court

awarded the Gillmors were in the form of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in prosecuting
this action to defend their title to their land. The amounts paid by the other defendants,
to whom the Gillmors deeded their interest in a portion of the subject property, have no
relationship to the damages assessed against Cummings for slandering the Gillmors' title.
No issues of joint liability exist in this case. Although Cummings may be entitled to some
credit in his litigation with the other defendants' title insurer, no such consideration is
appropriate in this case. The property belongs to the Gillmors and Cummings has cited
to no theory of law or equity to establish that he is entitled to any "credit" for the price the
Gillmors received for their own property.
POINT ffl
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED CUMMINGS'
DEFENSE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
Cummings asserts that the district court erred in failing to find that a new boundary
had been established, by acquiescence.

He asserts that the evidence shows that the

property was fenced "prior to 1964" and that no one complained until this action was filed
on October 15, 1987. Cummings correctly cites the elements necessary to establish a
boundary by acquiescence, viz., (1) an occupation up to a visible line marked by
monuments, fences or buildings; (2) mutual acquisition to the line as a boundary; (3) for
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a long period of time, generally not less than twenty years; 4) by adjoining landowners.
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990).
However, in this case the district court found:
There is no evidence of any agreement for a long period of time
between the plaintiffs, or their predecessors in interest, or the
defendant and his predecessors in interest, of any boundary line
established by acquiescence in any fence, natural object or road other
than the boundary established by the record legal description. . . ."
(Finding 4 of Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. R. 1280-81). The trial
court's finding on this issue was correct, and Cummings' assertion of error should be
rejected, for several reasons.
First, the appellant's brief would have the Court believe that all of the evidence
demonstrates that the boundary line Cummings now asserts, which the trial court found
different from the boundary specified by the legal description, has always been fenced and
that a single, identified fence has been recognized as the boundary. This is incorrect. The
record contains evidence that several fences, along different lines, have existed in this area.
Frank Marcellin testified that his father, Emil, built a fence along the former route
of Old Ranch Road before the road was realigned by the WPA, "To designate his property
line." (R. 1483-84). This fence line, corresponding to what the district court found to was
the actual boundary described in the deeds, was observed by Frank Gillmor, Sr., and his
brother, Ed Gillmor, as the boundary between the Gillmor and Marcellin parcels. (R.
1958). Mr. Marcellin testified that the Gillmors would trail their sheep to their property
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and would go through this fence to Kimball Creek in the spring and the fall of each year.
(R. 1960-61).
Frank Marcellin further testified that in 1963 or 1964 he observed a new fence being
installed adjacent to the present alignment of Old Ranch Road, directly to the west of the
road. (R. 1955-56; 1979). This barbed wire fence was installed where there had not
previously been a fence. (R. 1955). Mr. Marcellin testified that this new fence, running
along the west side of the re-aligned Old Ranch Road, was taken down several years later,
"as fast as it went up". (R. 1979). Within a year after that fence's removal, another fence,
constructed of crossed-poles was put in, along a different line running north and south just
west of the road. (R. 1980).
In summary, Mr. Marcellin's testimony shows that the fence his father built was
along the old alignment of Old Ranch Road, and that the fence Cummings had installed
in 1963 or 1964 was only in place for "several years" before it was torn down, and another
fence, of different materials and along a different line, was built. Since this suit was filed
in 1987, twenty years could not have passed since the erection of the most recently
constructed fence along what Cummings claims is the boundary established by acquiescence.
The various witnesses called by Cummings, quoted in appellant's brief, make no
distinction between the original fence built by Emil Marcellin, the new barbed wire fence
installed in 1963 or 1964 and removed several years later, and the crossed-pole fence which
was built last of all. However, for reasons discussed in Point I above, it was Mr. Marcellin,
who had grown up on the property, had actually repaired the fence built by his father, had
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visited the property on a daily basis until 1961 or 1962, and had thereafter patrolled the
area for twelve years as a highway patrol trooper, and who is a credible and disinterested
witness, whom the trial court chose to believe.
Accordingly, there is substantial evidence, as accepted by the trial court, that the
subject property was not fenced for twenty years or longer, as would be required to
demonstrate a boundary by acquiescence.

Cummings has failed to marshal evidence

showing that the trial court's conclusion on this point was clearly erroneous.
In addition, there is no evidence in the record that there was ever a mutual
acquiescence to any line as the boundary between the two properties except Frank
Marcellin's testimony that the Gillmors' predecessors used a gate in the fence Emil
Marcellin had built to designate the boundary of his property, when the Gillmors' sheep
were driven down to Kimball Creek. (R. 1960-61).
For these reasons, Cummings' assertion of a boundary by acquiescence should be
rejected.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED CUMMINGS'
ASSERTION OF TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Cummings also appeals the trial court's ruling which prevented him from introducing
evidence that he had acquired the subject property by adverse possession.

However,

Cummings neglects to point out that adverse possession was never pleaded in his Amended
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Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 842). Neither was the issue raised in Cummings' trial brief.
(R. 939).4
The district court ruled that to permit evidence of payment of taxes in an effort to
show adverse possession would have prejudiced the Gillmors. The trial court stated:
I think it would be a surprise to Mr. Kinghorn in the case, and I think
it is raised in - the issue is pointed out in the initial pleadings, but
was not raised in the answer.
* **

. . . [B]ut nothing was said concerning that, and I think for me to
allow you to raise that at this time would be prejudicial to the
plaintiffs [sic] case, . . . .
(R. 2063).
It is clear that adverse possession is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded.
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 160 (Utah 1943). Inasmuch as the defense
of adverse possession was not raised in Cummings' Amended Answer or Amended
Counterclaim, the trial court was justified in excluding evidence of the payment of taxes in
order to prevent prejudice to the Gillmors.

Although Cummings did not so plead, the defense of adverse possession was properly raised
by several of the other defendants, Janet Garlick and Allen Pelton, who moved for summary on the
issue. However, the Gillmors produced property tax notices and cancelled checks showing that they
paid all of the property taxes and Garlick and Pelton had not paid the property taxes on the property
for seven consecutive years, (R. 646), as would be required by the rule in Parsons v. Anderson, 690
P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1984). Those motions based on adverse possession were denied. (R. 678).
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POINT V
CUMMINGS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR SLANDER OF TITLE WAS
PROPERLY DISMISSED.
In his Amended Counterclaim, (R. 845), Cummings sought damages and punitive
damages against the Gillmors for slander of his title, alleging that because of a notice of
lis pendens filed in this action, he was unable to sell a portion of the subject property to
a third party.

Conclusion 4 of the district court's Amended Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law states:
4. The defendant Cummings' counterclaim should be dismissed
based on the defendants' failure to introduce adequate, credible
evidence in support thereof and as a matter of law because the filing
of the Lis Pendens and amended Lis Pendens in connection with this
case are and were privileged in law.
(R. 1284).
The district court's ruling was entirely proper for three reasons: First, Cummings
cannot establish a slander of title since he failed to prove title to the property in dispute.
The district court quieted title in the Gillmors and sufficient evidence of record supports
that determination.
Second, the evidence clearly shows that the sale which Cummings claimed was
thwarted by the Gillmors' Notice of Lis Pendens failed for reasons other than the recorded
notice. Paragraph 5.1 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, dated March 27, 1992,
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 22), discloses the Gillmors' Notice of Lis Pendens and permits
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Cummings to convey that portion of the property by a quit-claim deed. Accordingly, if that
sale did not close, it must have been for some reason other than the Gillmors' lis pendens.
Third, under Utah law, a litigant has an absolute privilege to file a notice of lis
pendens concerning property the title to which is subject to determination in that litigation.
In Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1976), the Supreme Court expressly adopted
the rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 638 (1965), which states:
A party to a private litigation . . . has an absolute privilege to
disparage another's property in or the quality of his land, chattels, or
intangible things in the institution of or during the course and as a
part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates if the
disparagement has some correlation thereto.
The Court went on to observe that
. . . since the effect of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of
all the facts apparent on the face of the pleadings, the recordation of
a notice of lis pendens is, in effect, a republication of the pleadings.
Since the publication of the pleadings is absolutely privileged, the
republication thereof by recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly
privileged.
Id. at 190. See also Stewart v. Fahey, 481 P.2d 519, 521 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); Zamarello
v. Yale, 514 P.2d 228, 231 (Alaska 1973); Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405, 409 (Cal.
1956); Hauptman v. Edwards, Inc., 553 P.2d 975, 979 (Mont. 1976); Superior Construction,
Inc. v. Linnerooth, 712 P.2d 1378, 1382 (N.M. 1986).
The Gillmors' publication of a notice of lis pendens in this action is absolutely
privileged and Cummings' claim for damages for slander of title as a result of the notices
is manifestly meritless and should never have been raised either at trial or in this appeal.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY REFUSING TO
AWARD THE GILLMORS ALL OF THEIR ATTORNEYS' FEES.
As stated in Point II, above, the trial court awarded the Gillmors only a portion of
their attorneys' fees and costs necessary to prosecute this action, as special damages against
Cummings for slander of title. The trial court found that:
11.
The plaintiffs have expended the sum of $81,140.27 in
legal services which are in evidence and additional amounts for legal
services which are not in evidence which accrued after the
introduction of the exhibit by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs expended
the sum of $11,993.50 for survey and engineering costs and for
professional survey costs in connection with the litigation.
(Finding 11, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 1283). However, the
district court ultimately awarded the Gillmors' their costs and "50% of the $81,140.27 in
attorneys fees or the amount of $40,570.14 . . . against the defendant Cummings."
(Conclusion 2, Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (R. 1284).
The district court explained his ruling on the award of attorneys' fees, as follows:
[By the court]: And I do think damages have resulted to the
true owner. But I don't think that damages - the court is not going
to award the $93,133 damages as prayed for.
I feel that there has been an escalation of attorneys fees as a
result of three attorneys being in the case, each one getting geared up.
I also think that other matters have gotten involved in this case.
Now of course counsel can argue that the appeal was taken up,
that that was a situation as far as the other parties are concerned in
the matter, and settling that, and what has taken place. But I'm not
persuaded that all of it was done strictly to quiet title to the property.
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The court is going to award to the plaintiff the costs of
$11,993.50. And that's if my notes are correct. And the court will
award 50 per cent of $81,140.27, which, if my notes are correct, was
the attorneys fees prayed for.
(R. 1791-92). However, the district court did not articulate how the attorneys' fees were
excessive or what a reasonable fee would be nor any other rationale in support of his ruling
in this regard.
The Gillmors recognize as a general rule, that a trial court has the discretion to
determine reasonable attorneys' fees to be awarded, and that amount will not be disturbed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d
163, 173 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, just as surely, this discretion is not without limits.
Any award of attorneys' fees particularly attorneys' fees which are awarded as special
damages, must be made "on the basis of findings of fact supported by the evidence and
appropriate conclusions of law." Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985).
Moreover, Utah law is clear
that unless the court offers an explanation for the reduction of the
attorneys fees requested in a case where there is adequate and
uncontroverted evidence in the record to support the fees, it abuses
its discretion.
Govert Copier, 801 P.2d at 174. Thus, the appellate courts "have consistently encouraged
trial courts to make findings to explain the factors which they considered relevant in
arriving at an attorney fee award." Id. This would be especially important in this case,
where the attorney fees constitute the measure of damages suffered by the Gillmors as a
result of Cummings's slander of title.
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At trial, the evidence showed total attorneys' fees of $81,140.27 as reflected in
Exhibits 41-P and 42-P and the testimony of Nadine Gillmor. (R. 1222-25). The Gillmors'
former counsel testified concerning the difficulty of obtaining discovery responses from
Cummings and the necessity of suing not only Cummings, but those individuals who
purchased various parts of the subject property from him and from others through his chain
of title. (R. 1922-23). They testified that the legal work performed was required by actions
Cummings had taken constituting slander of the Gillmors' title. (R. 1921; R. 1930-31). The
Gillmors' second counsel, Mr. Athay, testified that extra work necessitated by a change of
counsel was "at most three hours." (R. 1939). Further, although defendants other than
Cummings pursued an interlocutory appeal during the course of the litigation - an appeal
in which Cummings did not participate as a party - that litigation was nevertheless a result
of Cummings' attempting to convey the Gillmors' property to third parties. (R. 1940-41).
No contrary evidence was presented.
If the district court was concerned about duplication of efforts through the Gillmors'
three attorneys through the course of this lengthy litigation, or that work performed was
not reasonably required by the litigation, the district court had an obligation to articulate
its reasoning predicated upon the facts and to express its conclusions based on that analysis
so that its judgment might be reasonably evaluated by the parties and by the reviewing
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court. Here, there is nothing to examine. The court below, simply and summarily, chopped
the attorneys' fees in half without any analysis whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing demonstrates, Cummings cannot sustain the heavy burden of
showing clear error justifying reversal of the district court. Both the weight and quality of
the evidence favor the Gillmors on the multitude of points raised by Cummings on appeal.
However, the trial court erroneously and arbitrarily slashed the Gillmors' attorneys'
fees, without making its analysis and the factual basis of its action a part of the record.
This was clearly outside the scope of its discretion and merits reversal on the Gillmors'
cross-appeal.
DATED this fli& day of January, 1995.
PARSONS

, KINGHORN & PETERS

R. L. KNUTH
Attorneys for Appell
and Cross-Appella

At an earlier point in the proceedings, thq/ trial court noted an inclination to award the
Gillmors two-thirds of their attorneys' fees as special damages. (R. 1135). However, no more
analysis or factual basis was offered than was present in the district court's final Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law where the amount ultimately awarded was only half of the total fees
shown.
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